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in the organic world. Under unifying causality, in order to account for the "progressive complication" in the phylogeny, he finds a place for Aristotle's generic individual, and even discovers in history signs of a "suprapersonal unity" in human society.

The last of the four lectures is a metaphysical inquiry rather than a plea. It is concerned with the possibility of a "monism of order"—"the doctrine that the universe is one ordered whole." This idea, he concludes, is in conflict with the facts so long as the "whole" is regarded in Spinozian fashion as spatial throughout, "every characteristic of the Absolute" having "a spatial symbol." It is quite possible, however, our author thinks, "that the world of experience proper *can* only give us a fragmental knowledge of absolute Reality," since there may be therein "innumerable qualities which are not spatially symbolized and are therefore unknowable." "Therefore, from our piecemeal experience we can never say whether there be not a monism of order in the Absolute."

Driesch himself is unable to accept such a faith monism, though he regards the denial thereof as involving renunciation of the "fulfilment of logical postulates" and total inability to solve the problem of evil. These conclusions illustrate afresh our author's tendency to argue from disjunctives which are not true exclusives. It is assumed that the metaphysician is shut up to a choice between monism and agnosticism. Pluralism is not even noticed. Notwithstanding, however, his confessed lack of metaphysical belief Professor Driesch regards his neo-vitalism as logically legitimizing a faith monism in those to whom it is possible. He says, "Our vitalism . . . violates the Spinozian dogma, also, for it looks upon Nature as something which can not be comprehended under spatial symbolism" (p. 77). "It is no longer necessary to look upon spatial data as a strange image of the Absolute in its completeness and then to be disappointed with this strange image. There *is not* a complete 'image' of the Absolute in space" (p. 78).

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The Ego and Its Place in the World. CHARLES GRAY SHAW. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 523.

This book, the author's "retort to the world," analyzes that world into appearance, activity, and reality, and then construes the phenomenal world in the light of esthetics as the place of joy, the causal world by means of ethics as the place of work, and the substantial world after the manner of religion as the place of truth.

The analysis involves a discussion of the problem of traditional metaphysics, enriched by the contents of art and science, ethics and religion; and the purpose of it all is to obtain a higher synthesis of material already obtained by investigation and analysis. Reality is found "to consist of something graded, so that there is reality in appearance, still more reality in activity, while its full nature is found in the substantial."

Though this "dialectic," as the author likes to call his book, has grown out of university lectures, one must not imagine that it is to be read

rapidly or understood easily. There is much wealth of historical illustration, allusion, and metaphor; but if the reader is not at his best—and it is hard to be at one's best through five hundred closely written pages—the very profusion of illumination is sometimes confusing and disconcerting.

The following extracts give some idea of the author's way of putting things.

"Where the activistic element in egoism is wanting, the result is weakness and resultlessness; self-knowledge leads but to self-hatred. This half-egoism, with its Hamlet-like introspection, was dreaded by Turgénieff, who so longed for the activistic that he constantly exalted the character of Don Quixote as the man of action. Where Litvinoff in "Smoke" is the type of purely contemplative egoist, Bazaroff in "On the Eve" stands for the quixotic activist. The frank admission of activism as a phase of inner and outer existence does not put us in a position where we must acknowledge such a doubtful proposition as the superiority of the will over the intellect. In such a situation the will would defeat the very purpose for which it strives, and end in a kind of Beylism, as its author, Stendhal, called it, wherein the self acts in blindness. The anti-activism and anti-egoism of Geulinx tends to arouse such a revolt, and the ego which is conscious of its volitional powers is not ready to relinquish reality upon such unconvincing grounds. It was in this way that Nietzsche, who sought the superman in the pages of Stendhal, did not fail to strike back at Geulinx with his *despectio sui*" (p. 311).

"The positive will to be makes more vivid an impression upon the mind when it is contrasted with its rival, the will not to be. How blind has been philosophy not to have observed that the antique contrast between being and not-being has a modern significance almost terrible to contemplate. From Hobbes to Nietzsche, from Geulinx to Wagner, this contrast, this burning antinomy, has been contemplated as a fascination. Where the Dionysiac in man urges him to exist in all the fullness of his earth-life, the calmer Apollonian mood counsels the passivity of contemplation; where Siegfried affirms his being as that which belongs to him, Tristan denies his individual right to continue his existence and surrenders a *göttlich ewiges Ur-Vergessen*. Whatever be one's ultimate view of life, he can not deny the fact that spiritual negation is possible for man, whose existence is so slenderly connected with and meagerly interpreted by nature that the physical fact of self-existence is not necessary ground for self-assertion, which must come from within. This work of self-affirmation thus becomes doubly necessary in the life of man, who must resist the absorbing influences of both the natural and the spiritual. With the final view of the world before us, as will be found in the following book, this problem of self-despection will assume a somewhat different character" (pp. 326-7).

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